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Abstract 
 
 
 This paper assesses if legal origin explains domestic, foreign, private and public 
investments through financial intermediary channels of depth, efficiency, activity and size. 
Findings show that legal origin matters in the finance-investment nexus; though its ability to 
explain aggregate investment dynamics only through financial intermediary channels is limited 
in the cases of private and public investments.   
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1. Introduction 
 
 The law-finance nexus pioneered by La Porta et al. (1998ab) has long been the subject of 
much economic research, debate and controversy. One of these controversies centers on the 
dominance of English common-law countries in financial development prospects (Asongu, 
2011abc). More so two important components have been significantly missing in the legal 
origins debate: investment and Africa. Investment and finance undoubtedly remain key 
determinants of growth and development in the African continent. The issue addressed in this 
paper is the importance of legal origins in explaining cross-country differences in financial 
factors that are exogenous to aggregate investment dynamics. The work could contribute to the 
law-finance (growth) literature by providing a hitherto unexplored dimension of the Legal 
Origins Theory. The current recapitulation of the legal origins literature (La Porta et al., 2008) 
fails to account for an African study that focuses on the effects of colonial legacy on the finance-
investment nexus. A reason for this missing component could be traced to scanty statistics on 
law indicators in the African continent a decade past. Therefore, the added appeal of this paper is 
its use of novel data collected after pioneering works on the law-finance nexus to assess 
hypotheses resulting there-from.  
 The Legal Origin Theory on which this work is based traces the different strategies of 
common and civil law to different ideas and strategies about law and its purpose that England 
and France developed centuries ago. These broad strategies and ideas were incorporated into 
specific legal rules, but also into the organization of the legal system, as well as the human 
beliefs and capital of its participants. With conquest of new territory and colonization, human 
capital, legal ideologies and rules were transplanted as well. In spite of much legal evolution and 
amendment of law over time (La Porta et al., 1998b) the fundamental strategies and assumptions 
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of each legal system survived and have continued to exert substantial influence on financial and 
investment outcomes. This theory may be summed up in one sentence from Zweigert and 
Kötz(1998): “the style of a legal system maybe marked by an ideology, that is, a religious or 
political conception of how economic and social life should be organized”(p.72). This paper 
seeks to assess how these styles of different legal systems have survived over the years and 
continue to exert substantial influence on aggregate investment factors through financial 
dynamics in the African continent. The novel approach of classifying these styles into English, 
French, French sub-Saharan African, Portuguese and North African countries provides an 
exhaustive and thorough insight into an African perspective of the legal origin debate: hitherto 
unexplored. For clarity of purpose and motivation, the literature pertaining to this paper will be 
clubbed into two main strands: why legal origin matter in economic performance and the scope 
of the law-finance nexus.  
 
1.1 Why does legal origin matter in economic performance? 
 For organizational purposes literature that has been dedicated to addressing the concern 
of why legal origin matter in economic performance could be classified into three main 
categories. 
 In the first category, several papers consider ownership of particular economic activities 
and government regulation.  Djankov et al.(2002) observe the number of steps an entrepreneur 
must complete in order to begin operating a business legally, a number that in 1999 varied from 
two in Australia and Canada to twenty-one in the Dominican Republic. They assess the impact 
of such entry-regulation on corruption and the size of the unofficial economy. Djankov at 
al.(2003a) probe into government ownership of the media which remains extensive around the 
world, especially the television. Botero et al.(2004) construct indices of labor market regulation 
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and assess their influence on labor force participation rates and unemployment. Mulligan and 
Shleifer (2005a, 2005b) examine one of the ultimate forms of government intervention in private 
military conscription.  
 The second category of papers assesses the effects of legal origins on the features of the 
judiciary and other government organs on the one hand, and on the hand the effects of those 
(features of the judiciary) on the security of property rights and contract enforcement.  Djankov 
et al. (2003b) investigate the formalism of judicial procedures in various countries and its effects 
on the time it takes to evict a nonpaying tenant or to collect a bounced check.  This factor can be 
given a broader interpretation as the efficiency of contracts enforcement by courts and in fact 
turns out to be significantly correlated with the efficiency of debt collection by Djankov et al. 
(2006). La Porta et al. (2004) adopt a very different approach and collect data from national 
constitutions on judicial independence and the acceptance of appellate court rulings as a source 
of law. They inquire after whether judicial independence contributes to the security of property 
rights and the quality of contract enforcement.  
 In the third category, several studies in the aftermath of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998a) 
assess the effects of legal origins on investor protection and then the effect of investor protection 
on financial development. Some literature pertaining to this category looks at stock markets. La 
Porta et al.(1998a) measure of anti-director rights has been replaced by a measure of shareholder 
protection through securities laws (La Porta et al., 2006) and by another measure of shareholder 
protection from self-dealing by corporate insiders via corporate law(Djankov et al., 2008). As 
dependent variables, these studies use such measures as dividend payouts (La Porta et al., 
2000a), the ratio  of stock market capitalization to GDP, the voting premium, the pace of public 
offering activity(Dyck and Zingales,2004), Tobin’s Q(La Porta et al., 2002) and ownership 
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dispersion(La Porta et al.,1999a). Forecast for each of these variables emanate from standard 
agency models of corporate governance in which investor protection guides external finance 
(Shleifer & Wolfenzon, 2002). Another set of literature in this category looks at creditor rights. 
A case in point is the La Porta et al.(1997,1998a) measure from bankruptcy law that has been 
updated by Djankov et al.(2007) who also examine several subjective assessments of the quality 
of private debt markets. La Porta et al. (2002) focus on the state involvement in financial markets 
by assessing government ownership of banks. Djankov et al.(2006) use a different approach to 
creditor protection by looking at the actual efficiency of debt enforcement, as appreciated by 
creditor recovery rates in a hypothetical case of a firm that is insolvent. This later studies probes 
into the common criticism that it is law enforcement, rather that rules of books, which count in 
investor protection by integrating legal rules and features of efficiency measure.  
 All these categories help elucidate why legal origins play a role in financial development 
and growth. To come to grasp with the investment dimension of our paper, it is worthwhile to 
examine the current scope of the law-finance (growth) nexus.   
 
2.2 The scope of the law-finance nexus 
 The motivation of our paper requires the scope of literature on the law-finance nexus to 
be classified into four strands.  
 The first strand consists of a growing body of work which suggests that cross-country 
variances in legal origin explain cross-country differences in financial development. La Porta at 
al.(1997,1998ab) pioneered this strand and ever since, many an author have followed suit in the 
assertion that English common-law countries have better prospects for financial development 
than their French civil-law counterparts. They postulate that countries with common-law legacies 
(French civil-law origins) provide for the strongest (weakest) legal protection to creditors and 
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shareholders (La Porta et al., 1998ab, 2000ab). The edge common-law countries have over those 
with civil-law has been extended to other aspects of government and management: better 
institutions with less corrupt governments (La Porta et al., 1999b), more informative accounting 
standards (La Porta et al., 1998b), more efficient courts(Djankov et al., 2003b). Whereas this 
strand has been largely dedicated to understanding “if” legal-origin count in financial 
development, the concern of “why” legal origin matter (as outline in Section 2.1) constitute the 
second strand.  
 Among studies indentified in this second strand, to avoid monotony we shall elucidate 
one very important contribution to the literature not highlighted in Section 2.1. Beck et al.(2003) 
shed some light on the issue of “why” legal origin matter in financial development by 
empirically assessing two channel-oriented theories. The political channel lays emphasis on how 
legal traditions differ in the priority they attribute to the rights of individual investors vis-à-vis 
the state. Thus, championing investors rights should induce financial development.  The 
adaptability channel postulates legal traditions vary in their capacity to adapt to changing 
business conditions. Therefore, countries in which legal systems provide for adjustments with 
regard to changing and evolving circumstances should naturally be rewarded with higher levels 
of financial development. In summary this strand provides some light on the “why” puzzle in 
asserting that, legal origin matters in financial development because, traditionally legal origins 
differ in their ability to adjust and adapt efficiently to changing and evolving economic 
conditions.  
 In the third strand we find literature championing the law-finance (growth) nexus which 
is based on a positive finance-led-growth nexus (McKinnon, 1973). This assertion is shared at 
country level (King & Levine, 1993; Levine & Zervos, 1998; Allen et al., 2005), as well as at 
 8
industry and firm levels (Jayaratne & Strahan, 1996; Rajan & Zingales, 1998). Thus we find 
evidence of the link among law, finance and economic growth at firm, industry and country 
levels (Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998; Beck & Levine, 2002). 
 The fourth strand dedicated to African countries is pioneered by the Mundell(1972) 
conjecture, which theorized  that Anglophone countries shaped by British activism and 
openness(to experiment) would naturally be rewarded with higher levels of financial 
development than their French counterparts( shaped by Francophone reliance on monetary 
stability and automaticity)1. Recent legal origin literature has either wholly (Agbor, 2011) or 
partially (Asongu, 2011a) confirmed the superiority of English common-law over civil-law legal 
systems in growth and finance prospects respectively2. From a historical perspective, the 
partition of sub-Saharan Africa into British and French sphere in the 19th century resulted in the 
implementation of different colonial policies3. An important finding in Asongu (2011a)4 
debunked the dominance English common-law countries in prospects of financial development. 
                         
1
 “The French and English traditions in monetary theory and history have been different… The French tradition has 
stressed the passive nature of monetary policy and the importance of exchange stability with convertibility; stability 
has been achieved at the expense of institutional development and monetary experience. The British countries by 
opting for monetary independence have sacrificed stability, but gained monetary experience and better developed 
monetary institutions”(Mundell, 1972; pp.42-43). 
 
2
 While Agbor (2011) investigates how legal-origin affects economic performance, Asongu (2011a) proposes four 
theories in assessing why legal-origin matter in growth and welfare. Both studies are focused on the sub-Saharan 
part of Africa.  
 
3
 The British and French implemented two very different colonial policies. While the French imposed a highly 
centralized bureaucratic system that clearly underlined empire-building, the British administered decentralized, 
flexible and pragmatic policies. Economic ambitions dominated British colonial activities who sought to transform 
their colonies into commercially viable trading countries through the indirect-rule: producing raw material and 
consuming British manufactures. The French on their part propagated an imperial ambition through the policy of 
assimilation.  
 
4
 “This paper proposes and empirically validates four theories of why legal origin influences growth and welfare 
through finance. It is a natural extension of “Law and finance: why does legal origin matter?” by Thorsten Beck, 
Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine (2003). We find only partial support for the Mundell(1972), La Porta et al. 
(1998) and Beck et al.(2003) hypotheses that English common-law countries tend to have better developed financial 
intermediaries than French civil-law countries. While countries with English legal tradition have legal systems that 
improve financial depth, activity and size, countries with French legal origin overwhelmingly dominate in financial 
intermediary allocation efficiency. Countries with Portuguese legal origin fall in-between” (Asongu, 2011a; p.1). 
 9
In effect, Asongu (2011c)5 uses an “inflation-uncertainty” theory to boost theoretical validity and 
empirical justification as to why French civil-law countries have higher level of financial 
allocation efficiency. Some emphasis in this debate has also been tilted towards human 
development, with Asongu (2011d) assessing the link among law, economic and human 
development.  
 Based on the scope of this literature, as far as we have perused the influence of colonial 
legacies on financial development has been greatly covered in the literature (La Porta et al., 
1998b, 1999b, 2000b; Djankov, 2003b; Beck et al., 2003). However the investment dimension of 
the legal origins debate remains missing for the African continent. A reason for this missing 
component could be traced to scanty statistics on law indicators in the  continent a decade past. 
Therefore, the added appeal of this paper is its use of novel data collected after pioneering works 
on the law-finance nexus to assess hypotheses resulting there-from. Investment and finance 
undoubtedly remain key determinants of growth and development in the continent. The issue 
addressed in this paper is the importance of legal origins in explaining cross-country differences 
in financial factors that are exogenous to aggregate investment dynamics. The motivation is the 
paper could contribute to the law-finance (growth) literature by providing a hitherto unexplored 
dimension of the Legal Origins Theory. In line with the amendment of law over time 
hypothesis(La Porta et al.,1998b), the novel approach of classifying legal origins into English, 
French, French sub-Saharan African, Portuguese and North African countries provides an 
                         
 
5
 “The dominance of English common-law countries in prospects for financial development in the legal-origins 
debate has been debunked by recent findings. Using exchange rate regimes and economic/monetary integration 
oriented hypotheses, this paper proposes an “inflation uncertainty theory” in providing theoretical justification and 
empirical validity as to why French civil-law countries have higher levels of financial allocation efficiency. Inflation 
uncertainty, typical of floating exchange rate regimes accounts for the allocation inefficiency of financial 
intermediary institutions in English common-law countries. As a policy implication, results support the benefits of 
fixed exchange rate regimes in financial intermediary allocation efficiency” (Asongu, 2011c; p.1). 
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exhaustive and thorough insight into an African perspective of the legal origins debate: hitherto 
unexplored. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 discusses 
hypothetical financial channels between investment dynamics and legal origins. Data sources 
and methodology are revealed and outlined respectively in Section 3. Empirical analysis and 
discussion of results are reported in Section 4. We conclude with Section 5.    
   
2. Law, legal-origin, finance and investment theory 
 
2.1 The financial depth channel 
 
 Borrowing from Demirgüç-Kunt et al.(1999) and Asongu(2011a), we postulate that the 
quantity of money supply in the economy(M2) and the amount of money held by deposit money 
banks(Liquid liabilities) denote the financial depth channel. From monetary theory, financial 
depth is directly linked to the velocity of money which depends on economic activity. Economic 
activity is exogenous to investment and thus it could undoubtedly be inferred that financial depth 
is a channel to investment. Consistent with the law-finance theory, financial depth should be 
higher in countries with English common-law than in countries with French civil-law legacy, 
because the former provides for a more appealing atmosphere for openness (capital and trade) 
and competition. It results that economic conditions that favor openness and competition will 
naturally be rewarded with higher levels of financial depth at overall economic (M2) and bank 
(Liquid liabilities) levels. The above dialectical analysis could be summed up in one hypothetical 
sentence: common-law countries would exert a higher bearing on financial depth for investment.  
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2.2 The financial efficiency channel 
 
 The positive link between financial allocation efficiency and investment is crystal clear. 
In line with Asongu (2011c) French civil-law countries will turn to experience higher levels of 
financial intermediary allocation efficiency both at bank (banking system efficiency) and 
economic (financial system efficiency) levels. This is partly due to the low level of inflation 
typical of fixed exchange rate regimes that are characteristic of French civil-law countries in the 
African continent. It logically follows that French civil-law countries should exert a higher 
impact on investment through allocation efficiency than English common-law countries.   
 
2.3 The financial size channel 
 
 The relative importance of openness and competition should induce a broader financial 
system in common-law countries than in those with French civil-law. With a competitive 
atmosphere (in which a country is opened to trade and capital as emphasized by common-law 
tradition), increase in financial transactions and institutions will have a direct impact on 
broadening the size of the financial system. Thus, it logically follows that on average the 
financial size of civil-law countries will induce less investment than that of their common-law 
counterparts.  
 
2.4 The financial activity channel  
 
 Financial activity is a corollary of financial depth as the later is a direct result of the 
former (Asongu, 2011a). In the explanation provided in Section 2.1, we should expect English 
common-law countries to experience higher levels of financial activity and correspondingly 
greater levels of investment.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data  
 
 We assess a sample of 38 African countries with French; British and Portuguese legal 
origins (see Appendix 1). Consistent with legal amendments over time (La Porta et al., 1998b) 
we add dummies of French sub-Sahara and North Africa to the list of instrumental variables. The 
data (non-financial) is obtained from African Development Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank 
and range from 1996 to 2007 due to constraints in availability of law indicators (which only date 
from 1996). Financial intermediary variables in line with Demirgüç-Kunt et al.(1999) are 
obtained through computations from the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD). 
As highlighted by Beck et al. (2003) from Berkowitz et al. (2002), it is important to distinguish 
between legal origin countries (United Kingdom, the U.S.A, France, Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland) which make-up the legal traditions from transplant countries which received the 
legal legacies. For the purpose of this work, this doesn’t pose much of an issue because legal 
origins are fundamentally used as instruments.  In a bid for clarity, collected data is classified 
into the following categories.  
 
3.1.1 Financial channels 
 
. We stop short of collecting data on financial markets because Ivory Coast is the only 
country in Francophone sub-Sahara Africa (French civil-legal origin) with information on stock 
markets. Beyond this truism, the regional nature of its financial market renders it even harder to 
disentangle individual contributions of the eight West African countries that make-it up (seven 
French legal origin countries and one Portuguese legal tradition country). Conversely, we found 
many English law tradition countries with stock market information (Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe…etc). The four 
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North African countries also have stock market data. However since majority of countries do 
not, this disparity poses a practical hitch of coming-up with harmonious evaluation criteria for 
the financial market data. We are therefore poised to limit our analysis to the financial 
intermediary sector. Classification of the following indicators is in line the FDSD (Demirgüç-
Kunt et al., 1999) and very recent law-finance literature (Asongu, 2011ab). The following 
financial channels are narrowed from a plethora of financial development indicators (see 
Appendix 2). First and foremost we take all financial intermediary development indicators in the 
FDSD into account. Then we perform a correlation analysis based on the conceptual framework 
for financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, size and activity (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 1999). 
Lastly our selection of variables pertaining to each dynamic is shaped by usages in the finance-
growth literature and our ambition to present robust results for each financial intermediary 
dynamic. 
 
a) Financial depth 
 We evaluate financial depth both from overall-economic and financial system prisms by 
indicators of broad money supply (M2/GDP) and financial system deposits (Fdgdp) respectively. 
Both variables in ratios of GDP should robustly check one another as either account for over 
97% of information in the other (see Appendix 3). 
 
b) Financial efficiency 
 
 Here neither do we refer to the profitability-focused concept of financial efficiency nor to 
the production efficiency of decision making units in the financial sector (through Data 
Envelopment Analysis: DEA). What we yearn to address is the ability of banks to effectively 
meet-up with their fundamental role of transforming mobilized deposits into credit for economic 
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operators. We account for two measures: banking-system-efficiency and financial-system-
efficiency (respectively ‘bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd’ and ‘financial system credit on 
financial system deposits: Fcfd’). These two financial intermediary allocation efficiency proxies 
can also check each other as each represent more than 88% of variability in the other (see 
Appendix 3). 
 
c) Financial size 
 
 Borrowing from the FDSD we proxy financial intermediary activity as the ratio of 
“deposit bank assets” to “total assets” (deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit 
bank assets: Dbacba). Unfortunately we could not find another indicator of financial size despite 
an exhaustive search, thorough literature review, numerous computations and correlation 
analyses. 
 
d) Financial activity  
 
 The paper defines financial intermediary activity as the ability of banks to grant credit to 
economic operators. We appreciate bank-sector-activity with “private domestic credit by deposit 
banks: Pcrb” and measure financial-sector-activity with “private credit by domestic banks and 
other financial institutions: Pcrbof”. For robustness purpose, the later indicator checks the former 
as it represents more than 93% of information in the former (see Appendix 3).  
  
3.1.2 Investment dynamics  
 
Our investment variables entail: Gross Domestic Investment, Foreign Direct Investment, 
Gross Public Investment, Gross Private Investment and Gross Fixed Capital Formation. The very 
high correlation between domestic investment and fixed capital formation (see Appendix 3) 
compels us to drop the later in preference for the former. 
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3.1.3 Instrumental variables    
We assess traditional legal origin dummies for the French, English and Portuguese 
colonial legacies. In order to improve our contribution to the literature we add dummies for 
North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The dummies are primarily used as instruments. 
But for the SSAfrican French dummy which reflects about 85% of the French legal origin 
dummy, all other dummies reflect quite distinct information or variability (see Appendix 3). 
 
3.1.4 Control variables 
 
Our control variables are in line with the finance-growth literature (Levine & King, 1993; 
Hassan et al., 2011). We shall thus control for trade, population growth, inflation, GDP growth, 
GDP per capita growth as well as government’s general final consumption expenditure in the 
investment-finance regressions.  
 
3.1.5 Choice of endogenous explaining variables for control at the second-stage of the TSLS 
 
The choice of endogenous covariates for control at the second-stage of the TSLS 
estimation method is very imperative for goodness of fit and model specification. These 
covariates must a priori be justified by an underlying theory in which they are endogenous to the 
instruments. Borrowing from the law-finance literature (La Porto at al., 1998b; Beck et al., 2003; 
Asongu 2011b) we control for regulation quality and the rule of law at the second-stage of the 
TSLS approach.  
 
3.1.6 Brief comparative analysis from Table 1 
 
Table 1 shows comparative summary statistics for the English, French, French sub-
Saharan, Portuguese and North African countries. A close look suggests that while English, 
Portuguese (but for Private investment) and North African (but for Foreign investment) are 
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above average (data mean) in investment dynamics, French sub-Saharan and French countries as 
well below continental averages. Sub-Saharan French countries on average have lower levels of 
investment than the overall French mean. Regarding law variables only English common-law 
and North African countries are above the continental averages; French countries surpass French 
SSAfrican and Portuguese countries with the later (but for the rule of law)  edging over the 
latest.  
From the financial development perspective, contrary to popular consensus North African 
countries on average dominate in financial intermediary aspects of depth, size and activity. What 
is also quite remarkable and consistent with recent law-finance literature (Asongu, 2011abc) is 
the overwhelming dominance of countries with French civil legal origin in financial intermediary 
efficiency. Law indicators are also found to be least in Portuguese and French sub-Saharan 
countries and highest on average in North African countries. These figures justify the basis of 
including sub-Saharan and North African dummies in the empirical analysis.  
While countries with French civil-law have the lowest levels of inflation, English 
common-law countries (with the exception of Portuguese countries) reflect the highest level of 
trade. These preliminary findings from comparative summary statistics are in line with our 
expectations and consistent with the law-finance (growth) literature (Asongu, 2011ab; Agbor, 
2011)6. 
 
 
                         
6
 With the exception of Portuguese countries, English countries reflect higher levels of trade because they 
traditionally have legal systems that provide for openness (in trade and capital) and competition: this is in line with 
Agbor (2011). Conversely it is not unexpected that countries with French legal tradition should have the lowest 
levels of inflation. French colonial monetary legacy is focused on lowering levels of inflation because their former 
colonies have sacrificed financial independence and monetary experience for exchange stability (Mundell, 1972; 
Asongu 2011ac). 
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3.1.7 Brief analysis of tests of difference in means from Table 2 
The purpose of the test for the difference in means between samples (legal origins) of the 
population (African continent) is to assess whether differentiating various indicators by legal 
origin is really worthwhile. Therefore, statistically significant differences in the means between 
various instruments across variables indicate that classifying African countries by legal origins 
helps explain cross-country variations in the indicators under consideration.  
 In Table 2(but for private investment in Panel B) there is significant evidence of 
differences in instrument-means across variables. It is not unexpected that not all tests should be 
significant to justify the adoption of legal origin dummies as instruments (La Porta et al., 1998b; 
pp.1131-1148). 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
Borrowing from the law-finance (growth) literature, we adopt the Two Stage Least 
Squares (TSLS) estimation technique with legal origin dummies as instrumental variables (Beck 
et al., 2003; Agbor, 2011; Asongu, 2011 abcd). This estimation method has the particular edge of 
addressing the concern for endogeneity. The Instrumental Variable (IV) estimator can therefore 
avoid the bias that Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates experience when covariates in the 
regression are correlated with the error term. More so, the object of this paper is to investigate 
how legal origins affect investment dynamics through financial channels; which requires an IV 
estimation technique. This proposed approach will engender the following steps:  
-first of all our preference for a TSLS over an OLS estimation method will be justified by a 
Hausman-test for endogeneity; 
-then, we shall verify that instrumental variables are exogenous to the endogenous components 
of explaining variables (financial channels), conditional on other covariates (control variables); 
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-last but not the least, the validity of the instruments will be tested through an overidentifying 
restrictions (OIR) test. 
 This highlighted methodology will entail the following models. 
 
 
 First-stage regression:  
 
++= itit BritishFinance )(10 γγ +itFrench)(2γ itPortuguese)(3γ
                       (1) 
                               itaNorthAfric )(4γ υα ++ itiX
 
 
 
++= itit BritishFinance )(10 γγ +itFrenchssa)(2γ itPortuguese)(3γ
                  (2) 
                               itaNorthAfric )(4γ υα ++ itiX  
 
 
Second-stage regression: 
 
++= itit FinanceInvestment )(10 γγ +itiXβ µ
                                                      (3) 
 
 In the three equations, X is a set of control variables. For the first/second and third 
equations,  v  and u, denote the disturbance terms respectively. The instruments are the five legal 
origin dummies with Frenchssa: denoting the Francophone SSAfrican dummy. 
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     Table 1:  Comparative Summary Statistics 
 
Stats 
 
Data 
Financial Intermediary  Indicators Investment Variables Law  Vles Control  Variables Instrumental Variables 
Depth Efficiency Activity Size                   
  M2 Fd Bcbd Fcfd Pcrb Pcrbf Dba GDI FDI PrivI PubI FCF R.Q R.L Infl Tra Popg G.E GDPg GDPpc Eng. Frch. Port. Frssa. Nafri. 
 
 
Mean 
English       0.377 0.32 0.60 0.68 0.20 0.24 0.71 23.2 4.36 13.3 7.42 20.7 0.37 0.40 10.4 87.3 2.10 16.1 4.61 2.45 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 0.26 0.18 0.84 0.86 0.14 0.15 0.71 19.7 2.18 12.8 6.36 19.3 0.30 0.27 3.3 64.4 2.59 12.7 4.12 1.52 --- --- --- --- --- 
Portuguese 0.34 0.24 0.49 0.48 0.13 0.13 0.68 21.4 4.67 10.7 10.6 21.4 0.26 0.25 121 93.9 2.19 13.0 6.31 3.80 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 0.19 0.12 0.86 0.88 0.10 0.10 0.67 18.3 2.04 12.1 6.15 18.3 0.28 0.24 3.37 62.6 2.85 12.1 4.04 1.19 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafrica 0.64 0.53 0.72 0.75 0.38 0.41 0.88 24.8 2.83 14.3 8.38 22.9 0.41 0.47 3.63 66.7 1.45 14.9 4.58 3.10 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 0.31 0.24 0.70 0.75 0.17 0.19 0.71 21.2 3.31 12.9 6.96 20.0 0.33 0.32 19.4 76.8 2.35 14.2 4.56 2.15 0.42 0.47 0.10 0.39 0.10 
                                 
 
 
S.D 
English       0.27 0.25 0.27 0.49 0.19 0.30 0.26 10.4 5.89 7.65 4.22 9.45 0.18 0.21 15.2 46.0 0.88 5.77 3.78 3.58 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 0.17 0.15 0.28 0.30 0.13 0.15 0.17 7.74 4.03 6.60 2.78 7.14 0.14 0.17 8.86 28.7 1.19 4.71 4.31 4.06 --- --- --- --- --- 
Portuguese 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.27 4.37 2.52 4.58 1.57 4.37 0.16 0.25 597 35.8 0.37 4.54 7.33 7.08 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 0.05 0.05 0.24 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.14 7.58 4.27 6.66 2.61 7.36 0.13 0.15 9.68 30.2 1.13 4.83 4.58 4.22 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafrica 0.17 0.15 0.36 0.42 0.19 0.21 0.10 4.58 2.52 5.73 3.47 3.30 0.13 0.14 3.06  19.1 0.33 2.57 2.34 2.35 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 0.23 0.21 0.30 0.40 0.16 0.23 0.22 8.95 5.08 7.01 3.56 8.16 0.17 0.21 201 39.5 1.04 5.41 4.56 4.34 0.49 0.49 0.30 0.48 0.30 
                           
 
 
Min 
English       0.00 0.00 0.17 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.01 3.48 -5.7 0.27 0.09 3.48 0.04 0.02 -10 17.8 -1.0 5.41 -16.7 -17.1 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 0.06 0.02 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.33 4.30 -8.6 -2.4 1.39 4.31 0.05 0.01 -10 21.5 0.59 2.65 -12.6 -15.1 --- --- --- --- --- 
Portuguese 0.10 0.05 0.13 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.11 18.3 1.63 5.97 8.55 18.3 0.04 0.01 -3.5 36.8 1.45 6.33 -28.1 -29.6 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 0.06 0.02 0.21 0.22 0.02 0.02 0.33 4.30 -8.6 -2.4 1.39 4.31 0.05 0.01 -10 21.5 0.70 2.65 -12.6 -15.1 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafrica 0.31 0.23 0.14 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.62 16.8 0.26 2.40 3.56 16.3 0.15 0.10 0.33 38.3 0.59 10.3 -2.22 -3.59 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.01 3.48 -8.6 -2.4 0.09 3.48 0.04 0.01 -10 17.8 -1.0 2.65 -28.1 -29.6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                           
 
 
Max 
English       1.27 1.05 1.40 2.60 0.75 1.52 0.99 63.7 33.2 43.9 25.0 63.5 0.77 0.81 132 224 4.23 35.1 27.4 22.6 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 0.97 0.78 1.71 1.64 0.60 0.66 0.99 60.1 34.5 49.5 13.7 59.7 0.69 0.61 31.1 156 10.5 28.7 33.6 29.0 --- --- --- --- --- 
Portuguese 0.78 0.71 0.80 0.80 0.44 0.44 0.99 30.9 8.58 21.7 13.9 30.9 0.55 0.76 4145 179 3.03 21.2 20.6 17.1 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 0.36 0.27 1.71 1.64 0.24 0.27 0.99 60.1 34.5 49.5 13.7 59.7 0.69 0.51 31.1 156 10.5 28.7 33.6 29.0 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafrica 0.97 0.80 1.27 1.61 0.60 0.66 0.99 33.6 10.4 27.2 15.1 31.2 0.68 0.61 18.6 108 1.92 19.3 12.2 10.5 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 1.27 1.05 1.71 2.60 0.75 1.52 0.99 63.7 34.5 49.5 25.0 63.5 0.77 0.81 4145 224 10.5 35.1 33.6 29.0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
                           
 
 
Obs 
English       187 187 191 187 187 187 186 143 157 153 167 164 144 143 178 192 192 179 192 192 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 210 210 214 210 210 210 214 208 159 198 203 208 162 162 203 212 216 210 216 216 --- --- --- --- --- 
Portuguese 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 12 12 12 12 12 36 36 48 36 36 36 48 48 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 174 174 178 174 174 174 178 172 135 168 173 172 135 135 167 176 180 174 180 180 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafrica 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 36 42 42 48 36 36 48 48 48 48 48 48 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 445 445 453 445 445 445 448 363 328 363 382 384 342 341 429 440 444 425 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 
                           
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations. M2: Monetary Base. Fd: Financial system deposits. Bcbd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. Fcfd: Financial system credit on Financial system deposits. 
Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbf: Private domestic credit by financial institutions. Dba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. R.Q: Regulation Quality. RL:Rule of Law. Infl: 
Inflation.Tra: Trade. Popg: Population growth. GE: Government Expenditure. GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpc: GDP per capita growth. Popg: Population growth. Vles: Variables.GDI: Gross Domestic Investment. FDI: Foreign 
Direct Investment. PrivI: Gross Private Investment. PubI: Gross Public Investment. . Eng: English legal origin. Frch: French legal origin. Frssa: French Sub Saharan Africa. Port: Portuguese legal origin. Nafri: North Africa. 
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Table 2: Test of difference in means  
   Panel A: Financial Intermediary  Development Dynamics  
   Financial  Depth   Financial Efficiency 
   Monetary Base Financial System Deposits   Banking System  Efficiency Financial System Efficiency 
   Eng Fr Por Frssa Nafri Eng Fr Por Frssa Nafri   Eng Fr Por Frssa Nafri Eng Fr Por Frssa Nafri 
 
Legal origin 
dummies 
(Instruments) 
Eng 0 5.12 0.84 8.63 -6.42 0 6.74 1.97 10.1 -5.39  Eng 0 -8.7 2.74 -9.85 -2.52 0 -4.4 2.71 -4.68 -0.93 
Fr  0 -2.79 4.98 -14.0  0 -2.37 5.03 -14.3  Fr  0 8.34 -0.79 2.56  0 8.25 -0.55 2.04 
Por   0 8.10 -7.62   0 7.14 -7.79  Por   0 -10.0 -3.91   0 -10.0 -4.09 
Frssa    0 28.9    0 -29.6  Frssa    0 3.25    0 2.55 
Nafri     0     0  Nafri     0     0 
 
                         
   Financial  Activity   Financial  Size 
   Banking  System  Activity Financial System Activity             
   Eng Fr Por Frssa Nafri Eng Fr Por Frssa Nafri   Eng Fr Por Frssa Nafri 
 
Legal origin 
dummies 
(Instruments) 
Eng 0 3.00 2.07 6.18 -5.92 0 3.68 2.37 5.81 -3.53  Eng 0 -0.16 0.76 1.80 -4.35 
Fr  0 0.52 3.95 -9.90  0 0.81 4.00 -9.60  Fr  0 1.19 2.75 -6.55 
Por   0 2.52 -7.29   0 2.25 -7.57  Por   0 -0.27 4.82 
Frssa    0 -17.2    0 -17.1  Frssa    0 9.27 
Nafri     0     0  Nafri     0 
                         
                         
   Panel B: Investment Dynamics 
   Domestic and Foreign Investments   Private and Public Investments 
   Domestic Investment Foreign Investment   Private Investment Public Investment 
   Eng Fr Por Frssa Nafri Eng Fr Por Frssa Nafri   Eng Fr Por Frssa Nafri Eng Fr Por Frssa Nafri 
 
Legal origin 
dummies 
(Instruments) 
Eng 0 3.58 0.60 4.87 -1.03 0 3.83 -0.18 3.78 1.51  Eng 0 0.60 1.13 1.48 -0.85 0 2.87 -2.64 3.32 -1.36 
Fr  0 -0.72 1.87 -4.36  0 -2.10 0.27 -0.93  Fr  0 1.08 1.04 -1.41  0 -5.29 0.74 -4.08 
Por   0 1.40 -2.35   0 2.08 2.17  Por   0 0.69 2.02   0 5.89 2.20 
Frssa    0 -5.70    0 -1.05  Frssa    0 -2.03    0 -4.61 
Nafri     0     0  Nafri     0     0 
 
Eng: English. Fr: French. Por: Portuguese. Frssa: French Sub-Saharan Africa.  Nafri: North Africa.  Values in bold are t-statistics of at least 10% significance level. Significance of t-statistics is governed by both one 
and two tailed p-values. 
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4. Cross-country regressions 
 In this section we present results from cross-country regressions to assess the 
importance of legal origin in explaining cross-country variances in investment, the ability of 
legal origin to explain cross-country differences in the financial channels and the ability of the 
exogenous components of the financial channels to account for cross-country differences in 
investment. 
 
4.1 Legal origins and investments 
   
  As presented in Table 3, we regress investment dynamics on the French, British, 
French sub-Saharan, Portuguese and North African legal origin dummies and then test for 
their joint significance. Panel A presents results without control variables while Panel B does. 
In either case we find significant evidence at 1% level that distinguishing countries by legal 
origin helps explain cross country differences in aggregate investment dynamics (F-statistics). 
It is also worth noting that (but for population growth) all control variables have the rights 
signs and enter significantly in all regressions.  
  On average, results indicate that French legal origin countries have substantially lower 
levels of foreign investment, but overwhelmingly dominate in private investment. Portuguese 
countries are dominant in domestic, foreign and public investments. But for foreign 
investment and slightly public investment, sub-Saharan French countries stand significantly 
below French civil-law countries’ averages in domestic and private investments.  Whereas 
English common-law countries and Portuguese countries almost tie in domestic and foreign 
investments, North African countries joint them only in the tie of domestic investment and 
have significantly slimmer levels of foreign investments. Results of the control variables are 
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broadly consistent with the relevance of trade, inflation, government expenditure, GDP 
growth and GDP per capita growth in the investment-growth literature.  
  From the perspective of private investment, these initial findings are not consistent 
with the law-finance literature (La Porta et al., 1998b; Beck et al., 2003) where-in, English 
common-law countries which champion private property rights vis-à-vis those of the state 
should inherently reflect higher levels of private investment than French civil-law countries 
that emphasized state-power. The overwhelming dominance of French and French sub-
Saharan African countries (Models 7 and 7*) in prospects of financial development therefore 
debunks this consensus in the law-finance literature. Reasons for this contradiction could 
entail the following. (1)  The time series properties of our data. While La Porta, et al. (1998b) 
and Beck et al. (2003) do not provide time spans for their data because such was not 
necessary (as their studies were founded on facts for the most part), this paper is based on data 
ranging from 1996 to 2007; most probably collected after publication of the first working 
paper pertaining to the pioneering work of La Porta et al.(1998b). (2) With increasing 
globalization and economic integration, it is logical certain civil law traditions might be 
influenced by common-law traditions are vice-versa. A case in point in the African continent 
is the presence civil-law UEMOA countries in ECOWAS: largely dominated by countries of 
common-law traditions like Nigeria and Ghana. This explanation is consistent with the 
literature on the amendment of laws over time. (La Porta et al., 1998b; p. 1119). (3) Another 
insight in accordance with recent empirical findings could be borrowed from Asongu (2011c) 
where-in French civil-law countries are characterized by low levels of inflation resulting from 
their fixed exchange rate regimes. The corresponding inflation-predictability existing there-in 
could be the source of their overwhelming dominance in private investments. This 
 23
interpretation is further vindicated by the negative significant inflation coefficient in the 
private investment regression.  
 
Table 3: Investments and legal origins  
  Panel A: Investment regression without control variables  
  Domestic Investment Foreign  Investment Private Investment Public Investment 
  Model 1 Model 1* Model 2 Model 2* Model 3 Model 3* Model 4 Model 4* 
 
 
 
 
Legal origin  
Dummies 
(Instruments) 
English  22.842*** 21.625*** 4.368*** 4.253*** 13.300*** 12.450*** 7.279*** 6.961*** 
 (31.10) (26.28) (10.82) (10.47) (22.61) (19.96) (27.20) (25.68) 
French  18.924*** --- 2.195*** --- 12.838*** --- 6.075*** --- 
 (29.30)  (5.256)  (24.83)  (23.92)  
Frenchssa --- 18.300***  2.049*** --- 12.110*** --- 6.158*** 
  (24.65)  (4.739)  (20.57)  (23.36) 
Portuguese 21.409*** 21.409*** 4.671*** 4.671*** --- 10.742*** 10.667*** 10.667*** 
 (8.547) (7.616) (3.245) (3.221)  (4.877) (10.81) (10.66) 
Northafrica 4.959*** 19.457*** -0.081 1.420* --- 10.828*** 1.963*** 6.393*** 
 (3.650) (13.70 (-0.091) (1.675)  (9.094) (3.479) (11.83) 
 
F-test for Legal origin 8.972*** 417.24*** 5.334*** 38.491*** 563.95*** 248.637*** 11.793*** 391.14*** 
Adjusted R² 0.061 0.821 0.038 0.315 0.756 0.732 0.078 0.803 
Number of observations 363 363 328 328 363 363 382 382 
          
  Panel B: Investment regressions with control variables 
  Domestic Investment Foreign  Investment Private Investment Public Investment 
  Model 5 Model 5* Model 6 Model 6* Model 7 Model 7* Model 8 Model 8* 
 
 
 
 
Legal origin  
Dummies 
(Instruments) 
English  13.265*** 10.856*** 6.067*** 4.505*** 5.527*** 3.474*** 4.767*** 4.465*** 
 (8.974) (7.445) (8.977) (9.134) (4.808) (3.059) (9.003) (8.325) 
French  11.326*** --- 4.056*** --- 6.713*** --- 4.218*** --- 
 (10.81)  (4.784)  (7.968)  (9.993)  
Frenchssa --- 9.557*** --- 2.208*** --- 5.609*** --- 4.293*** 
  (8.528)  (5.023)  (6.228)  (9.812) 
Portuguese 12.688*** 12.540*** 6.956*** 4.830*** 4.391** 4.229** 8.493*** 8.841*** 
 (5.238) (4.906) (4.608) (3.300) (2.244) (2.006) (8.087) (8.617) 
Northafrica 5.081*** 10.185*** -0.850 1.076 2.220** 4.683*** 2.173*** 4.660*** 
 (4.441) (6.950) (-0.957) (1.291) (2.259) (3.719) (3.972) (7.624) 
 
 
 
 
 
Control 
Variables  
Inflation -0.081** -0.071** -0.071*** -0.074*** -0.071*** ---  --- 
 (-2.553) (-2.057) (-3.531) (-3.652) (-2.760)    
Trade 0.086*** --- --- --- 0.072*** --- 0.022*** --- 
 (7.941)    (8.341)  (5.024)  
GDPg 0.542*** --- --- --- 0.338*** --- 0.094** --- 
 (5.361)    (4.103)  (2.338)  
GDPpcg --- 0.675*** --- 0.151* --- 0.331*** --- 0.092** 
  (5.666)  (1.749)  (3.638)  (2.099) 
Popg --- --- -0.551** --- --- --- --- --- 
   (-2.068)      
Gov. Exp --- 0.676*** --- --- --- 0.518*** --- 0.145*** 
  (9.084)    (8.403)  (4.942) 
 
F-test for Legal origin 25.491*** 350.00*** 6.567*** 27.958*** 18.803*** 219.66*** 13.502*** 285.06*** 
Adjusted R² 0.303 0.878 0.084 0.350 0.240 0.783 0.140 0.817 
Number of observations 338 338 302 302 338 363 382 382 
Frenchssa: French Sub-Saharan Africa. GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. Gov. Exp. Government Expenditure. Popg: 
Population growth rate. *, **,***; significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
4.2 Legal origins and financial channels  
 
Table 4 assesses whether legal origin explains cross-country differences in the 
indicators which characterize the financial channel. This is the first condition for the 
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Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation technique which requires that the instruments (legal 
origins) explain financial channels conditional on other covariates (control variables). This is 
in line with equations (1) and (2) specified in Section 3.2.   We regress the proxies for 
financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, size and activity on the legal origin dummy variables. 
Due to issues related to over-parametization and multicolinearity the paper avoids using the 
French and French sub-Saharan dummies in the same regressions. We assess whether the 
exogenous components of legal origins explain financial indicators both in the presence 
(Panel B) and absence (Panel A) of control variables, such that we have eight regressions for 
each panel. We report the Fisher (F)-test of whether legal origin dummy variables taken 
together explain significantly cross-country variations in financial channels. Clearly from 
significance of estimated coefficients, the instruments are exogenous to cross-country 
variations in financial depth, efficiency, activity and size. Also the validity of the F-test at 1% 
significance level illustrates that legal origins taken together jointly substantially elucidate 
financial development differences across countries. Variables that are controlled for are all 
significant.  
The outcome in Table 4 also shows that while English legal-origin countries on 
average have substantially higher levels of financial intermediary depth, size and activity, 
their French legal-origin counterparts on average exert dominance in financial intermediary 
efficiency. Countries with Portuguese legal-origin fall in-between. This confirms recent 
findings of Asongu (2011abc). The addition of two dummies to the analysis sheds some light 
on the nature of North-African countries and their French SSAfrican neighbors. While the 
former dominates English legal origin countries in financial depth and activity, the later 
(SSA-French) has on average lower levels of financial depth, efficiency and size when 
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compared to average levels of other countries within the French legal-origin influence. A 
logical inference is that Francophone North African countries dominate their SSA-
Francophone counterparts in financial intermediary dynamics of depth, activity and size.  
 
Table 4: Financial development and legal origins 
  Panel A: Financial dynamic regressions without control variables  
  Financial  Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity Financial  Size 
  M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba Dbacba 
  Model 9 Model 9* Model 10 Model 10* Model 11 Model 11* Model 12 Model 12* 
 
 
 
 
Legal origin  
Dummies 
(Instruments) 
English  0.350*** 0.294*** 0.609*** 0.648*** 0.183*** 0.223*** 0.702*** 0.668*** 
 (25.58) (23.03) (30.92) (21.67) (17.22) (14.00) (43.16) (35.81) 
French  0.189*** --- 0.860*** --- 0.104*** --- 0.685*** --- 
 (13.81)  (43.56)  (9.783)  (42.59)  
Frenchssa --- 0.123*** --- 0.884*** --- 0.108*** --- 0.673*** 
  (9.416)  (28.72)  (6.609)  (35.58) 
Portuguese 0.341** 0.245*** 0.490*** 0.488*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.681*** 0.681*** 
 (12.72) (9.805) (12.59) (8.331) (6.621) (4.413) (21.49) (18.70) 
Northafrica 0.415*** 0.458*** -0.072* 0.597*** 0.263*** 0.357*** 0.197*** 0.720*** 
 (14.32) (18.13) (-1.735) (10.12) (11.68) (11.32) (5.776) (19.60) 
Fisher-test for Legal origin 81.551*** 291.307*** 40.035*** 382.97*** 50.42*** 108.35*** 11.496*** 872.67*** 
Adjusted R² 0.352 0.723 0.205 0.774 0.250 0.492 0.065 0.886 
Number of observations 445 445 453 445 445 445 448 448 
          
  Panel B: Financial dynamic regressions with control variables  
  Financial  Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity Financial  Size 
  M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba Dbacba 
  Model 13 Model 13* Model 14 Model 14* Model 15 Model 15* Model 16 Model 16* 
 
 
 
 
Legal origin  
Dummies 
(Instruments) 
English  0.247*** 0.257*** 0.849*** 0.424*** 0.311*** 0.274*** 0.809*** 0.353*** 
 (8.907) (8.588) (14.67) (6.482) (15.63) (5.644) (28.74) (9.815) 
French  0.101*** --- 1.104*** --- 0.223*** --- 0.834*** --- 
 (4.354)  (18.78)  (9.800)  (25.05)  
Frenchssa --- 0.145*** --- 0.715*** --- 0.158*** --- 0.385*** 
  (4.541)  (13.10)  (3.274)  (13.56) 
Portuguese 0.257*** 0.272*** 0.835*** 0.435*** 0.283*** 0.268*** 0.802*** 0.574*** 
 (6.055) (7.308) (11.40) (4.502) (9.958) (4.410) (18.90) (11.74) 
Northafrica 0.424*** 0.395*** -0.144*** 0.430*** 0.208*** 0.318*** 0.120*** 0.478*** 
 (15.06) (13.60) (-3.198) (6.062) (8.932) (7.765) (3.408) (13.51) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Control 
Variables  
Inflation -0.0001** --- --- --- -0.003*** -0.003*** --- -0.001* 
 (-2.499)    (-4.446) (-3.045)  (-1.787) 
Trade 0.001*** --- -0.001*** -0.001** --- -0.0005* --- 0.001*** 
 (6.598)  (-3.456) (-2.569)  (-1.858)  (5.422) 
GDPg -0.004** --- --- --- --- --- 0.006*** --- 
 (-2.126)      (2.704)  
Popg --- -0.047*** -0.057*** --- -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.062*** --- 
  (-5.923) (-3.923)  (-5.218) (-3.170) (-5.701)  
Gov. Exp --- 0.009*** --- 0.021*** --- 0.008*** --- 0.0150*** 
  (6.949)  (5.541)  (4.213)  (7.698) 
         
Fisher-test for Legal origin 53.054*** 248.029*** 21.836*** 243.46*** 42.61*** 61.134*** 14.106*** 759.39*** 
Adjusted R² 0.436 0.782 0.197 0.784 0.338 0.560 0.130 0.933 
Number of observations 404 414 425 402 408 379 436 380 
M2: Monetary Base. Fdgdp: Financial system deposits. Bcbd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. Fcfd: Financial system credit on Financial system 
deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on 
central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. Frenchssa: French Sub-Saharan Africa. GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. Gov. Exp. 
Government Expenditure. Popg: Population growth rate. *, **,***; significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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4.3 Examination of financial channels using an instrumental variable procedure  
 
The fifth and sixth tables below address two key issues: (1) the concern of whether the 
exogenous components of financial channels explain investment and; (2) if legal origin 
explains investment dynamics through other mechanisms than financial channels. To make 
these investigations we use the TSLS regressions. Thus we involve equation (3) in the first-
stage regressions (first and second equations). While the first issue is addressed by the 
significance of estimated coefficients, the second is looked at by the overidentifying 
restrictions (OIR) test whose null hypothesis postulates that the instruments (legal origins) are 
not correlated with the error term in the equation of interest (equation 3). Therefore, a 
rejection of the null hypothesis of the OIR test is a rejection of the view that legal origins 
explain investment only through the financial channel.  In the second-stage regressions we 
control for law in terms of regulation quality and the rule of law. Our choice of these variables 
is in line with the law-finance literature and has been elucidated in Section 3.1.5. In all 32 
regressions, control variables are significant for the most part; with the right signs.  
 Table 5 presents results for domestic (Panel A) and foreign (Panel B) investments. 
We begin by validating our choice of a TSLS estimation method with a Hausman test of 
endogeneity for model specification. The null hypothesis of this test posits that estimated 
coefficients by OLS are not consistent; implying they suffer from endogeneity because the 
variables in the equation of interest are correlated with the error term. Where the Hausman 
test fails to reject the null hypothesis (absence of endogeneity) we do not proceed with the 
TSLS; which is not the case of all sixteen regressions pertaining to the two panels. We also 
report the Cragg-Donald statistics of the weak instrument test of first-stage regressions.  
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Table 5: Investment and financial development (Second-Stage regressions) 
  Panel A: Domestic Investment regressions 
  Model 17 Model 17* Model 18 Model 18* Model 19 Model 19* Model 20 Model 20* 
 
Financial  
Depth 
M2 -13.803 --- --- --- --- --- -15.747* --- 
 (-1.644)      (-1.662)  
Fdgdp --- -16.982* --- --- --- --- --- -18.836* 
  (-1.709)      (-1.676) 
 
Financial 
Efficiency 
BcBd -1.531 --- -0.499 --- --- --- 8.456*** --- 
 (-0.415)  (-0.150)    (3.282)  
FcFd --- -2.750 --- -0.426 --- --- --- 7.022** 
  (-0.708)  (-0.129)    (2.325) 
 
Financial 
Activity 
Pcrb --- --- -12.915 --- -12.815 --- --- --- 
   (-1.497)  (-1.491)    
Pcrbof --- --- --- -10.848 --- -10.754 --- --- 
    (-1.330)  (-1.325)   
Financial 
Size 
Dbacba 20.308*** 20.284*** 21.122*** 21.183*** 20.366*** 20.528*** --- --- 
 (3.160) (3.147) (3.582) (3.578) (6.606) (6.663)   
 
Control 
Variables  
Reg. Qua. --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
         
Rule of L. 35.789** 38.111** 24.620** 23.537*** 25.179*** 24.009*** 60.495*** 62.268*** 
 (2.372) (2.415) (2.474) (2.379) (2.730) (2.612) (4.595) (4.393) 
Hausman test 92.631*** 89.815*** 64.917*** 66.604*** 57.883*** 60.359*** 191.30*** 197.07*** 
OIR(Sargan)  test 1.766 1.551 2.998* 3.489* 3.015 3.499 7.775** 7.539** 
P-values [0.183] [0.212] [0.083] [0.061] [0.221] [0.173] [0.020] [0.023] 
Cragg- Donald 3.055 2.823 6.051 6.167 6.731 6.742 4.965 4.335 
Adjusted R² 0.213 0.220 0.218 0.217 0.219 0.217 0.144 0.145 
F-stats 389.09*** 389.72*** 454.45*** 455.29*** 607.30*** 608.43*** 336.90*** 336.63*** 
Observations 257 257 257 257 257 257 260 260 
          
  Panel B: Foreign Investment regressions  
  Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 25* Model 26 Model 26* 
 
Financial  
Depth 
M2 -4.364 -0.832 --- --- --- --- 0.531 --- 
 (-1.098) (-0.276)     (0.050)  
Fdgdp --- --- -5.021 --- --- --- --- -5.962 
   (-1.063)     (-0.454) 
 
Financial 
Efficiency 
BcBd -4.815* --- -5.422* --- --- --- -1.417 --- 
 (-1.820)  (-1.812)    (-0.845)  
FcFd --- --- --- -2.861 --- --- --- -3.779 
    (-1.200)    (-1.175) 
 
Financial 
Activity 
Pcrb --- --- --- --- -13.550** --- -13.056 --- 
     (-2.119)  (-1.167)  
Pcrbof --- --- --- -15.36*** --- -13.88 --- -11.767 
    (-1.873)  (-1.572)  (-1.007) 
Financial 
Size 
Dbacba --- --- --- --- -1.325 -2.379 --- --- 
     (-0.561) (-0.738)   
 
Control 
Variables  
Reg. Qua. 22.779*** 10.059*** 23.738*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (2.894) (3.195) (2.697)      
Rule of L. --- --- --- 25.512*** 20.156*** 23.775** 18.995** 29.854** 
    (2.690) (2.665) (2.017) (2.442) (2.164) 
Hausman test 75.302*** 48.383*** 83.220*** 57.366*** 25.545*** 23.361*** 32.138*** 30.737*** 
OIR(Sargan)  test 1.337 6.210 1.411 0.931 2.266 3.245 1.159 0.638 
P-values [0.512] [0.101] [0.493] [0.627] [0.321] [0.197] [0.281] [0.424] 
Cragg- Donald 5.536 12.206 4.627 1.277 4.048 1.263 2.038 1.271 
Adjusted R² 0.004 0.041 0.001 0.027 0.010 0.018 0.012 0.012 
F-stats 24.952*** --- 24.921*** 22.256*** 32.541*** 27.009*** 24.657*** 15.203*** 
Observations 236 236 236 235 232 232 235 235 
M2: Monetary Base. Fdgdp: Financial system deposits. Bcbd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. Fcfd: Financial system credit on Financial 
system deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit 
bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. Reg. Qua: Regulation Quality. Rule of L: Rule of Law. *, **,***; significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. (): z-statistics. Chi-square statistics for Hausman test. LM statistics for Sargan test. [ ]: p-values. Weak I. Test 
(F-stats): Cragg-Donald statistics for Weak Instrument test at first stage regression. OIR: overidentifying restrictions. 
 
 
 The first issue of Panel A (with respect to domestic investment) is addressed 
by the significance of estimated coefficients which are valid for: financial depth at overall 
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economic (Model 20) and financial system (Models 17* and 20*) perspectives; financial 
allocation efficiency at banking system (Model 20) and financial system (Model 20*) 
standpoints; and financial size (Models 17 to 19).  As concerns the second issue, but for 
Models 18(18*) and 20(20*) the null hypothesis of the OIR test is not rejected for the average 
part; implying legal origins explain domestic investment only through financial channels. 
Conversely for Models 18(18*) and 20(20*) the instruments also explain domestic investment 
through some other mechanisms than the financial depth and efficiency channels.  
In the second Panel, the significance of banking system efficiency (Models 21 and 23) 
and banking system (financial system) activity from Model 25(24) address the first concern. 
For the second concern the null hypothesis of the OIR test is not rejected in all eight 
regressions. It follows that legal origins significantly elucidate foreign investment through no 
other mechanism than banking system efficiency, banking system activity and financial 
system activity channels.   
 Table 6 presents results for private (Panel A) and public (Panel B) investments. 
Justification of the TSLS methodology is provided by the rejection of the null hypothesis of 
the Hausman test; which applies to all sixteen regressions. With regard to the first issue, 
financial system depth (Model 30*), banking system efficiency (Models 27 and 28), banking 
system activity (Model 29) and financial size (Models 29, 29*, 30 and30*) are all significant 
determinants of private investment. For the second concern, the instruments also explain 
private investment through some other mechanisms beside the significant financial channels 
highlighted above. With respect to public investment, banking system activity (Model 32), 
financial system activity (Model 33*) and financial size (Models 34, 34*) all constitute 
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significant determinants (first issue). However legal origins also explain public investment 
beyond these determinants (second issue). 
 
Table 6: Investment and financial development continued (Second-Stage regressions) 
  Panel A: Private Investment regressions  
  Model 27 Model 27* Model 28 Model 28* Model 29 Model 29* Model 30 Model 30* 
 
Financial  
Depth 
M2 -2.841 --- --- --- --- --- -8.637 ---- 
 (-0.569)      (-1.642)  
Fdgdp --- -4.924 --- --- --- --- --- -12.047* 
  (-0.699)      (-1.911) 
 
Financial 
Efficiency 
BcBd 5.109* --- 9.204*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (1.843)  (5.004)      
FcFd --- 4.409 --- 4.351 --- --- --- --- 
  (1.056)  (1.049)     
 
Financial 
Activity 
Pcrb --- --- -8.954 --- -16.778* --- --- --- 
   (-0.786)  (-1.674)    
Pcrbof --- --- --- -7.560 --- -16.449 --- --- 
    (-0.698))  (-1.172)   
Financial 
Size 
Dbacba --- --- --- --- 14.897*** 13.617*** 15.441*** 13.610*** 
     (5.716) (3.563) (6.106) (4.599) 
 
 
Control 
Variables  
Reg. Qua. 29.830*** 31.689** --- 32.592** --- --- --- --- 
 (3.140) (2.254)  (2.155)     
Rule of L. --- --- 23.271*** --- 15.495 19.466 13.765 18.801* 
   (2.611)  (1.605) (1.201) (1.534) (1.819) 
 
Hausman test 107.86*** 140.17*** 98.71*** 157.32*** 25.173*** 25.098*** 34.204*** 34.500*** 
OIR(Sargan)  test 7.144** 6.534** 14.329*** 7.453** 8.177** 8.424** 7.623** 6.592** 
P-values [0.028] [0.038] [0.000] [0.024] [0.016] [0.014] [0.022] [0.037] 
Cragg- Donald 5.658 2.428 3.044 0.976 3.251 0.797 5.089 3.946 
Adjusted R² 0.009 0.007 0.031 0.014 0.120 0.102 0.098 0.100 
F-stats 229.70*** 212.89*** 280.00*** 240.69*** 346.08*** 308.04*** 325.26*** 323.72*** 
Observations 260 260 259 260 256 256 256 256 
          
  Panel B: Public  Investment regressions  
  Model 31 Model 31* Model 32 Model 32* Model 33 Model 33* Model 34 Model 34* 
 
Financial  
Depth 
M2 -0.132 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (-0.058)        
Fdgdp --- -0.958 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (-0.399)       
 
Financial 
Efficiency 
BcBd --- --- 4.222*** --- --- --- --- --- 
   (5.517)      
FcFd --- --- --- 1.026 --- --- --- --- 
    (0.737)     
 
Financial 
Activity 
Pcrb --- --- --- --- -7.482 --- --- --- 
     (-1.326)    
Pcrbof --- --- --- --- --- -20.07*** --- --- 
      (-2.819)   
Financial 
Size 
Dbacba --- --- --- --- --- --- 8.076*** 6.832*** 
       (6.563) (2.621) 
 
Control 
Variables  
Reg. Qua. 20.172*** 20.810*** --- 17.907*** --- --- --- 5.552 
 (8.485) (10.01)  (5.774)    (0.987) 
Rule of L. --- --- 11.224*** --- 23.323*** 31.895*** 2.724 --- 
   (7.036)  (7.441) (6.982) (1.046)  
Hausman test 183.54*** 200.05*** 131.94*** 222.97*** 205.22*** 224.57*** 107.65*** 99.53*** 
OIR(Sargan)  test 12.040*** 11.800*** 17.601*** 7.420** 32.128*** 15.321*** 9.928** 9.372** 
P-values [0.007] [0.008] [0.000] [0.024] [0.000] [0.001] [0.019] [0.024] 
Cragg- Donald 16.923*** 22.000*** 27.471*** 12.952*** 7.521 2.658 15.723*** 4.812 
Adjusted R² 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.001 0.084 0.159 0.005 0.0003 
Observations 275 275 280 275 274 274 277 278 
M2: Monetary Base. Fdgdp: Financial system deposits. Bcbd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. Fcfd: Financial system credit on Financial 
system deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit 
bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. Reg. Qua: Regulation Quality. Rule of L: Rule of Law. *, **,***; significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. (): z-statistics. Chi-square statistics for Hausman test. LM statistics for Sargan test. [ ]: p-values. Weak I. Test 
(F-stats): Cragg-Donald statistics for Weak Instrument test at first stage regression. OIR: overidentifying restrictions. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
 The motivations of this paper amongst others have been the importance of investment 
and finance in the development of the African continent; and the neglect of Africa in the legal 
origins debate. Some appeals of the work could be grasped from its usage of updated data on 
law indicators and addition of French sub-Saharan and North African dummies to those used 
in mainstream literature.  
 We have observed that contrary to current consensus (La Porta et al., 1998b; Beck et 
al., 2003) French civil law countries dominate in both private investment and financial 
allocation efficiency. The fact that Francophone countries also explain private investment 
through other mechanisms than financial allocation efficiency is not unexpected. Inflation, 
typical of fixed exchange rate regimes that characterize French countries in the continent 
remains a significant determinant (Asongu, 2011c). 
 Most significantly, legal origins matter in the positive relation between financial size 
and domestic, private and public investments. Legal origin generally matter in investment and 
finance; though its ability to explain aggregate investment dynamics only through financial 
intermediary channels is limited in the cases of private and public investments.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Countries selected for the study 
Colonial legacy Countries Num. 
 
 
English 
  
Botswana, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia. 
 
 
16 
 
French 
Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, 
Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, 
Tunisia. 
 
 
18 
Portuguese  Angola, Cape Verde,  Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique. 
 
4 
French  sub-
Saharan Africa 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, 
Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo. 
 
 
15 
North Africa Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia. 
 
4 
Num: Number of countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Correlation analyses for financial intermediary variable selection  
 Dbacba Llgdp Cbagdp Dbagdp Pcrbgdp Pcrbofgdp Bdgdp Fdgdp Bcbd 
Dbacba 1.000 0.269 -0.519 0.475 0.515 0.464 0.380 0.381 0.271 
Llgdp 0.269 1.000 0.099 0.822 0.651 0.551 0.943 0.952 -0.134 
Cbagdp -0.519 0.099 1.000 -0.024 -0.102 -0.112 0.041 0.036 -0.164 
Dbagdp 0.475 0.822 -0.024 1.000 0.930 0.839 0.894 0.879 0.254 
Pcrbgdp 0.515 0.651 -0.102 0.930 1.000 0.912 0.734 0.716 0.459 
Pcrbofgdp 0.464 0.551 -0.112 0.839 0.912 1.000 0.660 0.658 0.350 
Bdgdp 0.380 0.943 0.041 0.894 0.734 0.660 1.000 0.991 -0.129 
Fdgdp 0.381 0.952 0.036 0.879 0.716 0.658 0.991 1.000 -0.145 
Bcbd 0.271 -0.134 -0.164 0.254 0.459 0.350 -0.129 -0.145 1.000 
Dbacba: deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. Llgdp:monetary base. Cbagdp: Central bank assets on GDP. Dbagdp: 
Deposit bank assets on GDP. Pcrbgdp: Private domestic credit on GDP. Pcrbofgdp: Private domestic credit of banks and other financial 
institutions on GDP. Bdgdp: Bank deposits on GDP. Fdgdp: Financial system deposits on GDP. Bcbd: Bank credit on bank deposits 
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      Appendix 3: Correlation Matrix  
Financial Intermediary Determinants Investment  Dynamics Control Variables Instruments(Legal origins)  
Fin. Depth F. Efficiency F. Activity F.Size     First-Stage Control Variables 2nd Stage       
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacb GDI FDI PriI PubI   Infl Trad GDPg P.C G.E Popg R.Q R.L Eng. Frch. Frssa Port. Nafri  
1.00 0.974 -0.07 0.00 0.74 0.602 0.398 0.26 0.13 0.25 0.06 -0.06 0.29 -0.05 0.05 0.35 -0.45 0.38 0.62 0.21 -0.23 -0.43 0.03 0.49 M2 
 1.000 -0.05 0.06 0.80 0.684 0.466 0.29 0.11 0.27 0.06 -0.06 0.32 -0.01 0.10 0.39 -0.48 0.46 0.68 0.29 -0.28 -0.46 -0.00 0.45 Fdgdp 
  1.00 0.88 0.39 0.418 0.256 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.11 -0.24 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 0.00 0.19 -0.01 -0.29 0.44 0.43 -0.24 0.01 BcBd 
   1.00 0.53 0.674 0.290 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.08 -0.23 -0.09 -0.08 0.03 -0.05 0.28 0.09 -0.13 0.27 0.26 -0.22 0.00 FcFd 
    1.00 0.932 0.526 0.16 -0.08 0.17 -0.09 -0.06 0.09 -0.02 0.07 0.24 -0.40 0.60 0.62 0.15 -0.11 -0.30 -0.06 0.45 Pcrb 
     1.000 0.469 0.16 -0.09 0.13 -0.15 -0.05 0.04 -0.03 0.05 0.26 -0.35 0.56 0.53 0.19 -0.14 -0.28 -0.08 0.32 Pcrbof 
      1.000 0.35 -0.00 0.31 0.07 -0.09 0.21 0.06 0.13 0.29 -0.30 0.50 0.47 0.00 0.02 -0.14 -0.04 0.26 Dbacba 
       1.00 0.52 0.81 0.51 -0.16 0.46 0.19 0.26 0.37 -0.21 0.36 0.45 0.18 -0.18 -0.30 0.00 0.15 GDI 
        1.00 0.47 0.28 -0.14 0.44 0.04 0.09 0.31 -0.17 -0.17 0.05 0.19 -0.21 -0.20 0.05 -0.03 FDI 
         1.00 0.09 -0.22 0.44 0.12 0.17 0.27 -0.14 0.21 0.33 0.04 -0.01 -0.11 -0.05 0.07 PriI 
          1.00 -0.00 0.24 0.13 0.15 0.17 -0.01 0.13 0.25 0.11 -0.17 -0.20 0.18 0.14 PubI 
           1.00 0.10 0.08 0.07 -0.15 0.04 -0.09 -0.09 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 0.17 -0.02 Infl. 
            1.00 0.004 0.09 0.38 -0.39 0.04 0.23 0.23 -0.30 -0.29 0.12 -0.08 Trade 
             1.00 0.97 -0.02 0.22 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.09 -0.09 0.13 0.00 P.C 
              1.00 0.06 -0.01 0.07 0.07 0.05 -0.13 -0.17 0.13 0.07 GDPpc 
               1.00 -0.33 0.18 0.33 0.30 -0.26 -0.32 -0.06 0.04 G.E 
                1.00 -0.27 -0.34 -0.20 0.22 0.39 -0.04 -0.29 Popg 
                 1.00 0.79 0.21 -0.13 -0.23 -0.13 0.17 R.Q 
                  1.00 0.30 -0.22 -0.32 -0.11 0.23 R.L 
                   1.00 -0.80 -0.68 -0.29 -0.11 Eng. 
                    1.00 0.85 -0.32 0.18 Frch. 
                     1.00 -0.27 -0.27 Frssa 
                      1.00 -0.11 Port. 
                       1.00 Nafri. 
M2: Monetary Base. Fdgdp: Financial system deposits. Bcbd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. Fcfd: Financial system credit on Financial system deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic 
credit by financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. R.Q: Regulation Quality. RL:Rule of Law. Infl: Inflation.Trad: Trade. Popg: Population growth. GE: Government 
Expenditure. GDPg: GDP growth. P.C: GDP per capita growth. Popg: Population growth. Vls: Variables. Lend: Lending rate. Spread: Interest rate spread.GDI: Gross Domestic Investment. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. PriI: 
Gross Private Investment. PubI: Gross Public Investment. . Eng: English legal origin. Frch: French legal origin. Frssa: French Sub Saharan Africa. Port: Portuguese legal origin. Nafri: North Africa. 2nd Stage: Second-Stage 
control variables. 
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